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Public Opinion and Democratic Control of Sentencing Policy 
 
In this chapter I consider some of the reasons one might have for wishing to introduce 
public opinion into sentencing.1 I begin by attempting to say what is wrong with penal 
populism, and I argue that the reasons against appealing to public opinion leave some 
scope for a more positive assessment of public input. This raises two questions: on the one 
hand, what reasons might we have for giving the public some input into sentencing 
matters; and on the other hand, what form should that input take? The answers to these ǣǯwhat sort of public 
input would be valuable until we know why it is valuable. I look at three reasons that might 
be thought to justify public input of some sort into sentencing. First of all, public confidence 
in the justice system is surely important, and public input might be necessary to sustain 
such confidence. Secondly, public input might be thought, under certain conditions, to lead 
to better or fairer sentencing outcomes. And thirdly, it might be thought independently 
valuable for there to be genuine democratic control over sentencing. I will argue broadly in 
favour of such reasons, and so will in the end turn to the question of which institutions 
would be most suitable for public input. I am concerned in particular with the argument 
one might make for a certain model of public control over sentencing: the determination of 
sentences by jury rather than judge.2 
1. What is wrong with penal populism? 
First of all, what is wrong with penal populism (Pratt 2007; Roberts et al. 2002)? One thing 
that might be wrong with it, of course, is that it produces harsher sentences than can be 
justified. That means both that offenders suffer more than they ought to, but also that they 
are done an injustice. But there are some other aspects to penal populism that are 
unsavoury. In the accusation of penal populism, there is also an implication that all parties 
concerned ought to know better. The politicians ought to know better in that they should 
be courageous enough to be prepared to be honest with the public. But such courage is 
required of politicians collectively. When penal populism is regarded as a legitimate tactic 
by at least one party then the honest politician is vulnerable to a rival who will undercut 
her, as it were, appealing to a simple, eye-catching, or gut-grabbing, vision of black and 
white justice (in this there are parallels to the way in which workers who attempt to 
maintain a dignified refusal to work for less than a decent wage, are vulnerable to being 
undercut and therefore losing everything: a race to the bottom) rather than a more 
complex but more adequate picture. Democracy, conceived as a market in votes, might lead, 
like advertising, to an appeal to and reinforcement of an unthinking or immediate response 
to crime. Penal populism is problematic not only because of its effects on offenders and the 
injustice done to them, but also because it involves the cynical (or sometimes idealistic) 
manipulation of the public by politicians in the pursuit of power, in which the public are 
kept in partially complicit ignorance.  
One question that arises out of this is whether or to what extent these considerations 
demonstrate that public opinion and sentencing policy do not mix. For instance, it might be 
said that on any view that gives public opinion a role in determining sentences, there will 
be a risk that offenders end up being treated more harshly than they ought to be. However, 
in response, three things might be said. First of all, it is also at least possible that they will 
be treated less harshly. Secondly, even if responsibility for sentencing is given to judges 
informed by sentencing guidelines, there is still the possibility that offenders will end up 
being treated more harshly than they ought to, since it is not the case that sentencing 
judges or guidelines are infallible. Indeed, an argument would need to be given as to why 
they should be taken to be more accurate thaȋǯ
argument could not be given; simply that there would need to be such an argument. This 
issue will be considered below.) Thirdly, we often think that wrong decisions are made 
through democratic procedures, but that the decisions should nevertheless stand. This has 
been called the paradox of democracy (Wollheim 1969). Not really a paradox, it is simply 
the fact that, when one is committed to decisions being made democratically, one might 
often end up with two confǲǣǳǡ
the course of action one takes to be supported by the actual reasons; and on the other, the 
course of action decided by the vote. If one is committed to democracy, therefore, one 
might believe that the democratic decision made about sentencing is wrong, but 
nevertheless think that it ought to be followed, even though it will mean that the offender 
suffers more than he ought to, and is to that extent done an injustice. 
On the other hand, giving public opinion a greater role in sentencing decisions might 
extract some of the other poisons from penal populism. If politicians were not the ones 
deciding on sentencing policy then there would be no votes in claiming to be tough on 
crime. And taking responsibility for sentencing might on the other hand force members of 
the public to become better informed about criminal justice issues. 
That might, of course, seem like mere idealism. At any rate readers will need a good deal of 
argument to convince them that this is an option worth pursuing. The present chapter will 
not be able to fill that argument out fully, of course. It only aims to provide some reasons to 
think that further thought on the topic might be worthwhile. 
First of all, let me highlight some of the questions that we would have to deal with before 
we can claim to have a considered answer to the overall question of whether public opinion 
should have a role in determining sentencing levels: 
 What is the justification of punishment, or the purpose of sentencing? 
 What are the reasons for giving public opinion a role in sentencing? 
 What form will the introduction of public opinion take? 
 What is the nature and importance of proportionality in sentencing, and how can 
that be made compatible with allowing public opinion some influence over 
sentencing? 
It might not be obvious at first glance why the first question is relevant to this list. 
However, as will become clear, the justification one accepts for punishment and the 
institution of criminal justice will influence the reasons one thinks might count for giving 
public opinion some role in sentencing Ȃ for instance, what it would be for public opinion to 
further the aims of punishment, or contribute to its legitimacy. It also influences the 
reasons one might have for thinking that proportionality matters, what it consists in, and 
hence how public opinion might be made compatible with proportionality.  
The first thing to do, however, is to ask ourselves what the reasons are for giving public 
opinion a role in sentencing.  
2. Why give public opinion a role in sentencing? 
In the following sections we can consider a number of reasons that might be put forward 
for giving public opinion a role in sentencing policy. In thinking about these reasons we will 
inevitably have to say something about the wider question of the justification of the 
criminal justice apparatus and the shape that the introduction of public opinion might take. 
1) Increasing public confidence in justice. Considerations like this have been put forward by ǡǲ
from public opinion the legitimacy of the judicial system would be compromisedǳ (quoted 
in Ryberg 2010: 153). There are a number of things to note about this view. First of all, ǲǳǤǡǡ
sense we are interested in here, is a property of the occupier of a hierarchical social 
position, a property of a person or body in some sort of practical authority. But given that 
basic idea, legitimacy might be understood in a number of different ways. For instance, it ǯ
the power they do is a justified one. Or it might be the claim that there is a good 
justification for the existence of their hierarchical role, with its rights and responsibilities, 
and their occupation of it. Thus if an authority is legitimate, on this interpretation, the ǯmake the decisions it does, to impose duties on its subjects, to wield 
power over them, is a justified one. On this interpretation of legitimacy, however, it is not 
(or need not be) a condition of legitimacy that there is any particular relation between the ǣǯ
authority, the authority is justified if it makes it more likely that its subjects will comply 
with the reasons that apply to them (Raz 1986: 53). This condition might be met without 
the authority having any particular relation to public opinion.  
Sometimes, however, the idea of legitimacy is understood specifically as having to do with 
being recognised as being legitimate, or of having the confidence of the public. Here the 
issue is not so much justification as credibility. It is this variant of the idea of legitimacy that 
appears in the quote from Roberts: the legitimacy of the judicial system would be 
compromised if it were too far out of line with public opinion in the sense that it would no 
longer be regarded as being legitimate. There are two ways of understanding the idea of 
legitimacy that Roberts is invoking here. On the first, legitimacy simply is the property the 
occupier of a hierarchical social position might have of actually being supported by those 
over whom she rules, or whose lives she affects. On this interpretation, there is no 
distinction between being legitimate and being judged to be legitimate. On the second 
interpretation, the perception of whether someone in authority is legitimate might be 
justified or unjustified, accurate or inaccurate. The first interpretation is problematic since 
it makes legitimacy simply a matter of gaining acceptance. What matters for legitimacy is 
surely that there is acceptance for the right reasons. In which case we need to ask what the 
right reasons are Ȃ in which case we are asking whether the claim of the authority to be 
legitimate is a justified one, something that has to be settled by looking at the rationale for 
having that position occupied by that person or body, and not simply at the public 
perception thereof. 
The perception of legitimacy might still be very important, of course: for instance, on a 
social control or deterrence model of criminal justice, for the effectiveness of the 
sentencing process as part of an apparatus of social control or maintenance of public order: 
people must believe in the process in the process in a certain way, thinking that it is 
effective and that it gives them good reason to abide by social order. This might give those 
designing criminal justice institutions reason to make them responsive to public 
perceptions. Even on a more retributive view, it might be important, not just for justice to 
be done, but for it to be seen to be done. However, it might be thought that on a retributive 
view, the impetus is not so much to make the justice process responsive to public 
perceptions but to make it clear that the justice embodied in the process is recognised by 
the public. This raises an important issue about the direction of travel between public ǣǫǲǳ
to legitimacy Ȃ rejecting the idea that legitimacy consists simply in nothing more than 
justified authority. On this view we might say that legitimacy is justified credibility. 
This is an apt moment to raise another question about what exactly the relation between 
public opinǲȀǳ
approach. One thing that one might have in mind if one worries about public perceptions of 
criminal justice is whether the outcomes of judicial or sentencing decisions are in line with 
public opinion. Another thing one might be worrying about is whether there is public 
support, not necessarily for the outcomes, but for the processes and procedures by which 
those decisions are made: the outcomes may sometimes look strange to the public, but do 
they have confidence in the officials who make them and the procedures they follow in 
doing so? If so, then they may be prepared to accept some outcomes that appear to be out 
of line. A third way to read the aspiration to bring public opinion into sentencing, however, 
would be to stress the need for public control over sentencing, either in a direct or an 
indirect way. The first two options rely rather on the idea that public opinion should be in a 
position to endorse either outcomes or procedures; but it is not necessary that the public 
should be able to exercise control. Whereas on the latter view, some sort of control and a 
particularly direct form of accountability is necessary. Presumably for shoring up public 
confidence, it may be the case that only the endorsement of outcomes or procedures is 
necessary. However, it might be the case that, where confidence has got to such a low ebb, 
the public has to be given greater control over the process in order to restore confidence. If 
the public takes control of the process then, even if it delegates responsibility for making 
decisions to representatives in a bureaucracy, it might then become important that the 
outcomes or procedures be in line with public opinion. 
However, the approach to introducing public opinion canvassed at the end of the last 
paragraph sees any potential accountability of sentencing decisions to public opinion as 
merely a means to the end of making criminal justice effective. It is not a matter of right. If 
one could have stable social control without public participation or the alignment of 
sentencing decisions with public views then, on this view, that is what should happen. 
However, on a more ambitious view, on which matters of the rights of the public are 
invoked, it might be said that the reason sentencing decisions should be aligned with public 
opinion is that it is only then that they come to be truly justifiable Ȃ for instance, because it ǯǤIs there something that might 
justify that claim that the public has a right to be involved in sentencing decisions?  
2) Better, fairer outcomes? One argument for paying more attention to public opinion in 
deciding sentencing outcomes, or even for giving the public greater control over sentencing 
decisions, might be that this will lead to better quality sentencing decisions being made. 
There are various ways in which this claim might be made, some perhaps more plausible ǡǯing. It might be less 
plausible if one thinks that the purpose that determines sentencing is deterrence or 
incapacitation of the dangerous. It might seem clear here that what is required to make a 
good decision is expert knowledge, either of the behavioural tendencies of the offender, or 
the effect of the offender being punished on the behavioural tendencies of the population as 
a whole. The reliance on experts might be doubted, of course. We might doubt the 
purported wisdom of psychological experts. If that could be made plausible then it might 
open the way for an argument that, if we are attempting to make an intuitive assessment of 
ǯǡ
certain punishment, a collective decision is likely to be better than an individual one. This 
argument in turn could be made in two ways. One would appeal to the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem, which says that simply as a matter of mathematics, the majority decision of a 
large group is more likely, across a series of decisions, to approximate to the truth than 
individual decisions across the same series.3 Another would appeal rather to the 
possibilities of deliberation that precede a collective decision being made, arguing that such 
deliberation can correct for obvious mistakes and biases, can pool information, can lead to 
a number of perspectives being taken into account, etc (Aikin and Clanton 2010). 
Nevertheless, although this argument might be made, deterrent theorists might be 
unwilling to accept that this method is more likely to lead to correct outcomes than reliance 
on expert opinion. In the end, predictions of deterrent effect are complex probabilities 
relying on hard-to-ascertain matters of empirical fact, and it might plausibly be said that 
members of the public are simply not competent to make such decisions. 
However, matters might be different if we take up instead a non-empirical sentencing 
rationale such as retributivism. For the retributivist, the severity of punishment should be 
determined by the seriousness of the wrong. But this simple formula notoriously leads to 
difficult questions. For a start, there seems no simple way to categorise the seriousness of Ǥǲǳǲǳǫ
on one strand of retributive sentencing theory it is taken to be a sine qua non of 
retributivism that there must be some sort of determinate answer to such questions: an 
ordinal scale of offences at the very least (von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: Ch. 9). However, 
others are sceptical about this possibility.4 ǯ
depend on the precise and detailed nature of the offence and the offending circumstances? 
Where the wounding is caused maliciously, with the intent to cause serious and prolonged 
pain, whereas the manslaughter results from a stupid but minor lapse in attention, then 
although the act of wrongful killing is far more serious than the act of wounding, and its 
consequences more dreadful, it might be said that the culpability involved in the latter is 
far greater. How should those elements of the 1) act itself, 2) its intention, motivation or ǡ ?Ȍǲǳǫ 
Even assuming, however, that despite these problems we do have some grasp on ordinal 
proportionality Ȃ that is, which wrongs are more serious than others Ȃ if we move on to the 
question of cardinal proportionality Ȃ which wrongs are equivalent to or fitting to which 
punishments Ȃ then again it might seem hard to see a simple answer. How is the ordinal ǲǳ
crimes? 
The retributivist might acknowledge these difficulties but deny that they lead to the 
conclusion that there is no determinate answer to questions about proportionality. She 
might accept, though, that there is no simple way to determine what these answers are. 
Rather, as with many complex questions where we find it hard to specify an answer in 
advance of inquiry, she might say, what we have to do is rather to give an account of what 
an inquiry would have to be like for an adequate answer to be discovered. Then it might be 
said that, as an epistemic matter, we have no better grasp of the concept of an adequate e.g. 
conception of the seriousness of a particular wrong, or of a punishment fitting to a 
particular crime, than the answer (or, perhaps, range of answers) that might be given at the 
end of such an inquiry. For instance, one recent, broadly pragmatist approach to 
epistemology argues that we have no better grasp on the notion of truth than the outcome 
of a well-conducted inquiry; and that we have no better grasp on the notion of a well-
conducted inquiry than one that involves the possession and exercise of an appropriate 
range of epistemic or intellectual virtues (curiosity, conscientiousness, attentiveness, 
imaginativeness, etc).5 The range of virtues that an inquiry would have to display in order 
to be well-conducted would no doubt differ with the particular domains being inquired 
into. But the basic thought is that they are virtues that involve the pursuit, appreciation and 
correct weighing of relevant considerations, and the removal or overcoming of bias. 
Whether or not one accepts that pragmatist account of truth as such, one might well think 
that in a domain of inquiry such as that of retributive justice (if one accepts that there is 
such a thing as legitimate inquiry in this domain) we have no better grasp of a standard of 
correctness or adequacy for our judgements than that just given. Further, one might argue 
that it is quite likely that a group is more likely to possess and be able to exercise these 
virtues than is any individual working in isolation. 
If the considerations of the last few paragraphs are plausible then one might argue for a 
version of the claim that public opinion should have an input into sentencing: on a 
retributivist view, it might be claimed that sentencing decisions about proportionality are 
better made by a jury of citizens rather than a sentencing judge or magistrate. 
(Furthermore, for reasons having to do with the relation, on a plausible retributivist view, 
between the need for punishment and the need for apology and reparation, it might be that 
the participants in the jury ought to include the victim and the offender, if they are so 
willing.6) Having said this, however, it seems reasonably clear that a jury would benefit 
from some guidance or direction from a judge for a number of reasons: a) information 
about decisions in like cases might be epistemically useful as a starting point to fix 
standards, or to make clear the need for argument about the relevant differences of the 
case in hand; b) it is essential that the sentencing be for the wrong as captured in the 
legally-defined offence rather than the wrong as such, and the jury would need guidance on 
the difference between those two; and c) a virtue of a sentencing system is parity across 
like cases, and some guidance would need to be given to the jury to ensure that due 
consideration was given to that. But if a jury makes it clear in its judgement that it has 
taken such direction and guidance into account, and shows evidence that it has given each 
of these points due consideration, it might be that we have no better epistemic standard of 
what punishment crime deserves. 
3) Democratic authority. However, for some people, for all that some of these 
considerations might be helpful and persuasive in some respects, we have not yet got to the 
heart of what drives the argument for public control over sentencing. For them, the crucial 
question is not just about the quality of the outcomes, but rather about who is in charge. It 
is a question, not simply about how the make the best decisions, but who gets to make the 
decisions. It is a question, in other words, of authority. 
On some views, it follows straightforwardly from the fact that a body is best placed to make 
decisions that have good outcomes, that that body ought to be in charge. But even on those 
views, a concern for authority is something different from a concern for outcomes. 
Authority is a matter of having the right to make decisions, to have those decisions 
followed and implemented by those who are governed by the decision (those under the 
jurisdiction of the relevant body), to have those decisions treated as settling the question of 
what those governed by the decision should, as a group, do. There is a question of what 
justifies anyone having this hierarchical position. And on the range of views we are 
considering in this paragraph, this is settled straightforwardly by the fact that a particular 
body is more likely, on the whole, to make good, well-informed and effective decisions than 
any other body, and so that being governed by that authority will bring it about that those 
governed will act more in line with the reasons that apply to them than they would have 
otherwise.7  
Now even on this type of view, there must be more than wisdom that qualifies a body to be 
an authority. There is no point in having wisdom, for instance, unless when one speaks 
others will actually follow. So another necessary condition of the justification of some 
authority would have to be efficacy, or the ability actually to coordinate the action of a ǯǤre are some further, more serious problems with 
this sort of view. We can group these problems into two importantly different types. But 
addressing these problems might be thought to lead us in the direction of greater 
democracy, and greater incorporation of public opinion. 
First of all, there are concerns about epistemic access to the reasons governing the domain 
over which the authority rules. If we take the example of an authority setting laws to 
govern the whole of a political society, it seems clear that decisions will invoke normative 
matters. Now, while many theorists will reject pure subjectivism about normative matters, 
assuming that there at least some well-ordered practices of inquiry by which we can make 
headway in coming to determinate answers about practical questions, many think 
nevertheless that the notion of one body having wisdom in a certain area is problematic on 
the grounds that the considerations involved, and the process of weighing such 
considerations, are hugely complex. Reasonable humility should, on this view, lead any 
person or group to be wary of imposing their view on others, just because no one is 
infallible, and in such a complex area of thought it is very easy to go wrong.8 Some, indeed, 
go further, and assert, not just that true claims about normative matters are hard to 
discern, but that values are plural and incommensurable, and that there simply are always 
going to be a range of equally satisfactory answers to at least some normative questions 
(Berlin 2003). In which case it might be important for anyone making authoritative 
decisions on normative matters to take public opinion into account for the reason that they 
should accept that there are likely to be a range of epistemically reasonable positions on 
any one question, and reasonable humility dictates taking the view that there may be no 
good way of telling for certain whether the view to which one inclines oneself is in the end 
more adequate than an opposing view.  
Of course, even on this view, these considerations do not entail that officials should simply 
take public opinion on a particular question for granted, that they should translate it 
uncritically into public policy. Public opinion should be taken as a guide only insofar as the 
best explanation for the content of tǯǤǯǲǳ
result of lazy thinking, political rhetoric, manipulation, prejudice and bias (as in the case ǲǳinflames and distorts public opinion for certain ends) then on this 
line it need not be taken seriously. This is because the fact that a person espouses a certain 
view is not credible as a source of evidence about how things are, normatively speaking, if 
there is reason to think that they hold that view for non-epistemic reasons. It may be that ǯǡ
willingness to be intellectually serious when properly engaged. And we should have a ǯ
seriously about a matter when they say that they have. But neither of these points entail 
that, on the view being discussed in this paragraph, public opinion should be taken 
uncritically as a guide to public policy-making. Nevertheless, it may be plausible to think 
that, even after we take away those views that are ill-considered, biased or prejudiced, 
there will remain a range of serious public opinion and that reasonable answers to many of 
our pressing practical questions will not point in just one direction. Furthermore, and 
crucially for the example of the jury, we might think it plausible that we can design ideal 
deliberative fora in which individuals who might in many circumstances be tempted into 
lazy thinking are enabled to engage instead with depth and seriousness: for instance where 
it is clear that something important is at stake, and that they have a serious responsibility ǯ, and where the problem they are asked to solve is one that it is 
within their powers to solve (that it is reasonably focused, not overwhelming, etc.).  
On the basis of the considerations of the past two paragraphs, we might think that it would 
be problematic to allow any particular body or class of individuals (or ruling elite, drawn 
largely from a particular class, ethnic group and educational background) to be given 
responsibility for authoritative decision-making in a particular normatively charged 
domain, and that it would be more satisfactory if we attempted to find some compromise 
based on the range of serious public opinion, something that a citizen jury might be an 
attractive mechanism for bringing about. Thus even if one thinks that all that matters in the ǯ
directives, one might be inclined towards democratic decision-making. 
Secondly, however, the idea that wisdom confers (political) authority might be disputed on 
the basis of concerns about whether there really is nothing more to the justification of 
authority than the quality of guidance. For some, as well as concerns about the quality of 
the outcomes of decision-making, there are also concerns about the fairness of the 
procedures themselves (e.g. Waldron 1993). In particular, there is a concern that the 
procedures should be compatible with the equality of each person as a citizen and as a joint 
author of the actions of the state. On this view, anything the state does ought to be capable 
of being seen as an act taken on behalf of the people as a whole. But if the people as a whole 
is in charge then that means that each person should have exactly the same say in 
determining how the state should act, what its determining principles and policies are. In 
which case we can say that procedures by which policy decisions are made Ȃ including 
decisions about sentencing policy Ȃ have to be such as are compatible with the equality of 
each citizen, specifically the equal right of each to a say in determining what those policies 
are. 
Now there are two immediately pressing questions. One is about the value of democracy. 
Why should we think that a form of government is particularly important if it gives each 
(adult) member an equal say?9 Of course, there is much to say about this, but the basic 
intuition, which might be cashed out in various different ways, is that in the context of 
political life, no one should be treated as being more important than anyone else: that the 
dignity of each requires that they not be required publicly to accept a second-class status, 
and that they would have to accept a second-class status if some were given a right to 
greater say in decision-making than others. The upshot of this is that, regardless of the 
inevitable variations in epistemic acuity, each person has the same right as any other to 
determine what the policies of the state ought to be. 
Even if that is convincing, however, a second pressing question concerns the practical 
implications of the value of democracy: what does it actually mean for procedures to be 
compatible with the freedom and equality of each citizen? On this point, we could return to 
the distinction we made earlier between, on the one hand, the importance of public 
endorsement, either of sentencing outcomes or the procedures by which those outcomes 
are decided upon, and on the other public control over those outcomes. The importance of 
public endorsement might be kept in view by a set of benevolent officials who are 
committed to implementing only publicly endorsed policies, but where the public has no 
control, direct or indirect, over the way in which these officials act. This benevolent 
dictatorship is often thought to be problematic on the grounds that it is empirically unlikely 
that such an insulated group would remain committed to taking public views seriously. So 
some sort of mechanisms of accountability to the public might have to be introduced, by 
which the public exercise control and determine for themselves that their will is being 
followed.  
If this is so, however, there is a question of how much control is necessary. A central debate 
on this point is between those who believe that democracy is compatible with at least some 
significant decisions being made by representatives and those who believe that true 
democracy has to be direct. Even on the direct democracy view, however, the democratic 
input is often taken to be most important in the decision-making, and there can be room for 
plenty of delegation of powers to those who will implement those decisions. For instance, if 
there was democratic control of sentencing then at least one possibility would be that, 
although a group of citizens made the decisions, responsibility was delegated to a group of 
specialists to implement the decision. Furthermore, there might also be a specialist role for 
oversight of the implementation of the decision. Ultimately, of course, those who 
implement the sentence would be accountable to the jury, or to the public as a whole, for 
their carrying out the task. But the responsibility for day-to-day oversight and 
accountability might be something that it is compatible with democracy to delegate to a 
specialist. Of course, this might be denied: it might be argued that democratic control is 
only genuine when the sentence is implemented in and by the community itself. This might 
have certain benefits Ȃ it might build social solidarity, and encourage victims, offenders and 
others to engage with one another and develop important character skills by taking 
responsibility for these tasks rather than leaving it to the experts. On the other hand, it 
might be argued that democratic authority is not the only important value, and that 
offenders will be treated better and more effectively when a team gets the opportunity to 
specialise in that role rather than doing it in their spare time as public service. An argument 
for the more participatory model could either be made on empirical grounds, claiming that 
the trade-off between these values favours the punishment-in-the-community model, since 
the benefits to be gained for individuals and the community as a whole do outweigh the 
costs. Or it could be made by insisting that the importance of democratic authority does 
outweigh whatever costs community implementation might have. 
If it is accepted, however, that some degree of representation or delegation is compatible 
with democratic authority, what are the reasons to favour decision-making on sentencing 
by a citizen jury rather than by a group such as judges who are at least indirectly 
accountable to the public (for instance through the control of the legislature over 
sentencing guidelines)? We have mentioned a number of relevant considerations already: 
for instance, the epistemic value of a collective deliberative mechanism in tricky evaluative 
questions; such collective deliberation might be impossible to organise amongst the whole 
electorate for every sentencing decision, of course, but it would be possible to organise a 
group of citizens picked more or less at ranȋǯǯ
decisions). Furthermore, it might seem preferable, from what we have been saying, to have 
a small group of collective deliberators who are able to pay attention to the details of each ǯ rather than democratic control over some more abstract 
sentencing priorities that are then implemented mechanically by those to whom power to 
set sentences has been delegated. There is also the consideration that any group of 
representatives comes to have its own vested interests that might bias its decisions and 
might break the link with democratic control. And it is also very important to acknowledge 
that the citizen jury has an important symbolic value: it says very directly that the public is 
in charge.  
3. Conclusion: further questions 
In this chapter I have attempted to sketch out a route, or a number of routes, by which one 
might seek to justify introducing public opinion into sentencing policy in a specific way Ȃ 
viz. by having sentencing decisions made by a jury Ȃ and to provide some evaluation of 
those arguments. But there are important questions that I have left unaddressed. For 
instance, I have suggested that the argument for sentencing by jury would likely be at its 
most plausible if it is accepted that sentencing has an essentially retributive or desert-
based component: given the complexity of situations of criminal wrongdoing that cannot be 
captured by rigidly applied sentencing guidelines, and given the superiority of group over 
individual deliberation, there is at least an argument to be made that a jury would be best 
placed to decide on what that the retributive sentence should be. But what if one thinks 
that sentencing should be determined either in part or in full by considerations about 
deterrence or incapacitation? It might be said that in these domains expert knowledge 
trumps untutored collective deliberation. Even here, however, it might still be said that the 
final authority to make decisions rests with the people, on the grounds that the most 
important value for public policy is that it should be an expression of the will of (all) the 
people. If we find that thought plausible, perhaps the public should be advised by the 
experts, appearing as it were as witnesses, but the jury should make the final decision.10  
Another large question, though, is how far we think democratic decision-making in 
sentencing is of value, and how far we ought to prioritise democratic processes if they 
come up with decisions that are plainly wrong. Even on the strongest defence, democracy 
remains only one value amongst others. Therefore it might be said that defence of other 
values sometimes requires anti-democratic intervention in order to correct gross injustices 
that would otherwise be inflicted. Furthermore, democracy has certain foundational values 
Ȃ for instance, respect for the equality of citizens as self-determining beings Ȃ but a 
democratically constituted decision-making body might make a decision that contravenes 
those values. In these cases there could be a strong argument that democracy itself 
requires that the democratic decision be constrained (Brettschneider 2007). On the other 
hand, we need an account of a mechanism by which that constraint could be brought about. 
We have already suggested that a sentencing jury should have a legal adviser Ȃ should a 
legal official have the power, not just to advise, but in extremis actually to strike down a 
sentencing decision, or ask the jury to think again? Could the offender herself appeal 
against the decision? If so, who should the appeal be referred to? 
I should also note that sentencing by jury is not the only model of democratic control over 
sentencing that is worth considering. An alternative would be the model proposed by Paul 
Robinson,11 on which psychological experiments are used to make precise assessments of 
public opinion on questions of ordinal and cardinal proportionality, the results of which are 
used to formulate sentencing guidelines applied by judges. Proper assessment of this model 
is not possible here, but it is worth noting a number of advantages of the jury system. First 
of all, the jury system puts the public in a position, not just to endorse sentencing outcomes Ǥȋǯews 
about the extent to which it is legitimate for the public to delegate decisions to 
representatives.) Secondly, an aspect of my argument for the jury had to do with the 
epistemic value of decisions made by the public given the irreducible complexity of 
particular situations. I suggested that a group of deliberators might be better able to come 
to a view about the significance of the situation of wrongdoing as a whole. This would be 
lost if it were simply the case that a sentencing judge were required to respond more or 
less automatically to the presence of a certain feature in the criminal act. Thirdly and 
relatedly, the jury having control over the sentencing decision is able to respond to the 
offender as a human being rather than simply categorising her according to the guidelines, 
and this can be an important factor in reducing the likelihood of disproportionately 
punitive sentencing decisions. When the jury have the offender in front of them and they 
realise that they have responsibility for the future ǯǡ
least a possibility that this situation of human contact should have a transforming effect on 
those judging Ȃ ǲǳȂ an 
effect that it is hard to see could be brought about if retributive responses are being 
measured by responses to cases in laboratory conditions. On this last point, however, it is 
worth noting that my response assumes that the jury would indeed have the offender in 
front of them as a judge does in passing sentence: a full consideration of these issues would 
have to consider whether that is more attractive than the alternative that sentencing 
decisions should be made in anonymous conditions where e.g. the race, appearance, gender ǯ
ken. 
Other questions to be considered in a development of the arguments canvassed here might 
include: How long-lasting should citizen jury be? Should it be something more like a 
commission that lasts for six months or a year? Should it have exclusively lay membership? 
How would its membership be determined? On the latter question, it seems clear that it 
would be better for the purposes of genuine deliberation that jury members are appointed 
rather than elected on a platform, so that they have no manifesto commitments to defend, 
or public perceptions to take into account. However, if appointment is the way to go, is 
random selection best, or should there be an expert element to each jury (should there be 
e.g. an ex-offender on each jury?); and if randomisation is chosen, is it nevertheless 
important to ensure that the make-up of the jury reflects social diversity to a reasonable 
degree?12 
These are questions to be dealt with at a later date. I hope, however, to have made at least 
some headway in thinking constructively about how to improve the relationship between 
public opinion and criminal justice. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 A version of this paper was discussed at a symposium on punishment and public opinion organised by Julian 
Roberts and Jesper Ryberg in October 2012. I am very grateful to the organisers for inviting me to be 
involved, and for the comments I received at the workshop. I would particularly like to thank Paul Robinson, 
Albert Dzur and Richard Lippke.  
2 For a paper with somewhat similar aims, see Dzur (2012). 
3 ǲǡǡrule 
would be nearly infallibleǳ (Estlund 2008: 15). 
4 Cf. Duff (2001: 136)ǣǲȏȐǡǡǯ
crimes from extralegal moral understandings of them as wrongs. These moral understandings are more 
complex, particularised, and concrete than are the understandings available within such a legal framework. 
They preclude any unitary ranking of all crimes on a single scale of seriousness, since they connect the 
wrongfulness of different kinds of crime to different kinds of value that cannot without distortion be 
rendered rationǤǳ 
ǯGardner (1998).  
5 Because of the central rolǡǲǤǳSee Zagzebski (1996).  
6 ǲǳ Bennett (2008).  
7 Ǥǯǲǳ (Raz 1986). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 See, famously, ǲǳ: Rawls (1993).  
9 This has been recently denied by Arneson (2004).  
10 ǯǡǯ
determine whether the defence should be accepted, on the basis of expert testimony. 
11 This volume. 
12 Cf the considerations about democratic control of the police through police commissions in Loader (2000).  
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